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A NEW APPROACH TO RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
HISTORY OF FAIR TRADE LEGISLATION
The depression following 1929 gave impetus to the movement for
legislation which would allow the establishment of minimum resale prices.
Forty-five states enacted so-called fair trade laws by 1941.1 The statutes
apply to products sold under the manufacturer's trademark or brand
name which are in free and open competition with products of the same
general class. Contracts are authorized between the distributor and the
manufacturer whereby the distributor agrees, (1) to sell the product at
a stipulated or minimum price and (2) to require any other distributor
who may buy from him to agree to sell at the stipulated or minimum
price. This created a system of vertical price controls enabling the manu-
facturer to control the selling price of both the wholesaler and retailer.
Fair trade statutes have never applied to horizontal agreements between
distributors or between manufacturers. The heart of the statutory scheme
is the "non-signer" clause which binds non-contracting distributors of the
product to sell at the price agreed upon by the manufacturer and the dis-
tributor who have signed a fair trade agreement. A cause of action for
unfair competition is created against anyone who sells below the contract
price, provided he has notice of the contract.
In 1936, the United States Supreme Court, in the case of Old
Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp.2 disposed of the
"due process," "equal protection of the laws" and "unlawful delegation
of legislative power" objections arising under the Federal Constitution
against fair trade laws. The basic theory relied upon by the Court, and
later adopted by many state courts, is that this legislation protects the
ownership of the trademark or brand name which remains the manu-
facturer's property, even after the tangible product is sold to the dis-
tributor.
The Miller-Tydings Amendment to the Sherman Act was passed in
1937 to give statutory immunity from federal anti-trust laws to all fair
trade statutes. Without this enabling legislation, fair trade agreements in
interstate commerce would be in violation of the Sherman Act. In 1951,
the Supreme Court in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.a
held that the Miller-Tydings Amendment did not sanction interstate
enforcement of the "non-signer" provisions. Congress re-examined the
fair trade problem in 1952 and passed the McGuire Act,4 which exempts
resale price maintenance agreements and non-signer clauses from the
federal anti-trust laws and declares that such agreements do not con-
I Only Missouri, Texas, Vermont and the District of Columbia have never
enacted fair trade legislation.
2 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
3 341 u.s. 384 (1951).
415 U.S.C. § 45 (1952).
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stitute an unlawful burden on interstate commerce when authorized by
the law of the state in which the resale is to be made. This act, of
course, was a major victory for the proponents of fair trade.
The Supreme Court refused to take a new look at the Old Dear-
born decision in 1954 by denying certiorari to a Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals decision,5 despite cogent arguments for reappraisal by both the
dissenting opinion of Judge Holmes and the district judge.6
Thus, state fair trade laws continue to be considered valid under
the federal constitution and opponents have been forced to shift their
attacks to the state courts.
STATUS OF FAIR TRADE LAWS IN THE STATES
Fair trade statutes were not successfully challenged in the state
courts until 1949 when the Florida Supreme Court declared the "non-
Signer" clause of its fair trade act to be in violation of its constitution.
7
Michigan followed in 1952.' From 1955 to date9 fourteen more statesI °
have held the "non-signer" clause unconstitutional, including Utah and
Nebraska which held their entire fair trade act invalid." Although there
5 Schwegmann Bros. v. Eli Lilly Co., 205 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 856 (1953).
6 109 F. Supp. 269, 271-72 (E.D. La. 1953), "Perhaps after twenty years of
experience under fair trade acts, the Supreme Court may conclude that the real
purpose of these acts is not to protect the good will of the manufacturer, and that
price-fixing under these acts is not an appropriate means to that perfectly legiti-
mate end, but is in fact an end in itself. In other words, it may well be found
that the real purpose of fair trade legislation is to protect the retailer from com-
petition with another retailer who, because of his efficient merchandising methods,
is able to reduce his distributive costs and consequently his retail prices."
7Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1949).
8 Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman's Tool Shop Sporting Goods, 334 Mich. 109,
54- N.W.2d 268 (1952).
9 August 20, 1958.
10 Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. White River Distributors, Inc., 224 Ark.
558, 275 S.W.2d 455 (1955) ; Olin viathieson Chemical Corp. v. Francis, 134- Colo.
160, 301 P.2d 139 (1956) ; Cox v. General Electric Co., 211 Ga. 286, 85 S.E.2d 514
(1955) ; Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co. v. Shane Co., 143 N.E.2d 415 (Ind. 1957);
Quality Oil Co., v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 182 Kan. 488, 322 P.2d 731
(1958); General Electric Co. v. American Buyers Coop., Inc., CCH TRADE REG.
REP. (10th ed.) ff 69,058 (Ky. 1958) ; Dr. G. H. Tichenor Antiseptic Co. v.
Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets, 231 La. 51, 90 So. 2d 343 (1956) ;
McGraw Electric Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., 159 Neb. 703, 68 N.W.2d 608
(1955) ; Skaggs Drug Center v. General Electric Co., 63 N.M. 215, 315 P.2d 967
(1957); Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, Inc., 167 Ohio St. 182,
147 N.E.2d 481 (1958) ; General Electric Co. v. Wahle, 207 Ore. 302, 296 P.2d 635
(1956); Rogers-Kent, Inc., v. General Electric Co., 231 S.C. 636, 99 S.E.2d 665
(1957); General Electric Co. v. Thrifty Sales, 5 Utah 2d 326, 301 P.2d 741
(1956); General Electric Co. v. Dandy Appliance Co., 103 S.E.2d 310 (W. Va.
1958).
11 Virginia invalidated its Fair Trade Act not on constitutional grounds but
upon a holding that it was repealed by implication by the 1950 enactment of the
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are some recent decisions upholding fair trade acts in their entirety,12 the
trend is obviously towards invalidating at least the "non-signer" clause.
The Ohio Supreme Court, in holding this clause of the Ohio act un-
constitutional, offered the following reasons: (1) it constitutes an un-
authorized exercise of the police power in that there is no substantial
relation to the public safety, morals, or general, welfare, (2) it contra-
venes the "due process" provisions by arbitrarily denying a seller the
privilege of disposing of his own property on terms of his own choosing,
and (3) it delegates legislative power to private persons. 8
These adverse rulings in the state courts are an important cause for
the breakdown of the fair trade program. Another significant con-
tributing cause is enforcement difficulties, as illustrated by a recent de-
cision 4 holding that the New York fair trade act was unenforceable
against a mail order discount house located in the District of Columbia,
which has no fair trade law, even though mail order sales below fair
trade prices were made to New York residents. The sale took place in
the District of Columbia and enforcement of a fair trade agreement
can only be taken in a state that has a fair trade law. The effect of the
holding is that the manufacturer can no longer control the selling price
of his product if the consumer is willing to wait one day for postal
delivery from an out of state firm. Recent abandonment of fair trade
practices by many companies, including such giants as Westinghouse,
General Electric and Eastman Kodak, is easily understandable in the
light of these developments.
PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION
Proponents of resale price maintenance did not give up the fight.
On the contrary, they are attempting to revive and even expand their
system. Their aim would be accomplished by the enactment of a bill,
introduced in February 1958"5 which would amend the Federal Trade
Commission Act so as to "equalize rights in the distribution of identified
merchandise." Hearings on this bill have been held before the Com-
mittees on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of both houses of Congress
but the bill was not reported out of either committee. It is certain to be
reintroduced in the 86th Congress where a bitter fight is expected. The
declared purpose of the bill, which, like fair trade legislation, applies only
Virginia anti-monoply laws. Benrus Watch Co. v. Kirsh, 198 Va. 94, 92 S.E.2d
384 (1956). On March 8, 1958, Virginia passed a new Fair Trade Act effective
91 days after adjournment.. 2 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (10th ed.) if 15,120.
12 Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Skaggs Pay Less Drugs, 45 Cal. 2d 881, 291 P.2d 936
(1955); Lionel Corp. v. Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc., 15 N.J. 191, 104 A.2d 304
(1954); Burche Co. v. General Electric Co., 382 Pa. 370, 115 A.2d 361 (1955).
13 167 Ohio St. 182, 147 N.E.2d 481 (1958).
14 General Electric Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co., 244 F.2d 681 (2d Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 824 (1957).
15 H.R. 10527, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
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to products sold under a trademark or brand name in competition with
products of the same general class, is: (1) to recognize the interest of
the manufacturer in stimulating demand for his merchandise by per-
mitting him to maintain selling prices adequate to enlist the active efforts
of distributors, and (2) to equalize rights, by affording the small manu-
facturer an opportunity to compete on more nearly equal terms with
large manufacturers who can control selling prices by controlling dis-
tribution, and by affording the small retailer an opportunity to compete
on more equal terms with the large retailer.
The bill would give the manufacturer of a trademarked or identi-
fied product, if any portion of his production crosses a state line while
in the chain of distribution, the unilateral, unreviewable federal right to
fix the selling price of the product at all levels of distribution. Not only
may he set the selling price at the time the distributor acquires the mer-
chandise; he is also authorized to change- that selling price at any time
he desires.
The McGuire Act of 1952, as noted above, merely permits inter-
state enforcement of state fair trade laws, which require at least one
bona fide contract between the manufacturer and a distributor. The
proposed act differs in that it is not dependent on state law but creates a
federal cause of action against any distributor who sells at a price other
than that set by the manufacturer, provided that he has notice of that
price. This represents a drastic change by extending price fixing legis-
lation into those states that have never passed fair trade laws, as wfell as
those states that have held fair trade legislation to be in violation of their
constitutions. Another important difference is the lack of any contract
requirement in the bill. The Supreme Court in the Old Dearborn case
had reasoned that when a distributor purchased a fair trade item, he
impliedly consented to sell at the price agreed upon by other retailers
with the manufacturer. Such consent cannot be implied under the bill
unless it were to be qssumed that all distributors would consent to have
one person, or company, dictate to them the price at which they must
dispose of their property. Experience under the fair trade laws indicates
that such an assumption would be very unrealistic. Thus, the constitu-
tionality of the bill is in doubt since the Old Dearborn case is clearly
distinguishable.
OBJECTIONS TO THE BILL
The real effect of the bill would be anti-competitive, vertical price
fixing, designed principally to destroy competition at the retail level.
Inflexible price schedules, selected by the manufacturer, fail to make
any allowance for local conditions, or supply and demand, and are op-
posed to our traditional concepts of free enterprise. The uniform price
will usually be high enough to satisfy the high cost retailer. This will
have a detrimental effect on the consumer, the more efficient retailer and
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also on the manufacturer. The practice of selling merchandise at below
cost to "bait" customers into the store has been alleged to be an ever
present threat to fair competition,"8 but it has never been proven that the
practice is as frequent as fair trade supporters suggest. In any event, this
bill prevents all competitive price cuts,17 thus going far beyond the "loss-
leader" evil. Whether or not that particular evil should be curbed,
certainly price reductions that only reflect the increased efficiency of in-
dividual retailers should not be prohibited. Overhead savings should be
capable of being passed on to the consumer. Some may prefer to shop in
air conditioned stores in the down-town shopping district, with easy credit
terms and free delivery; but if a consumer is willing to buy in a store
without obtaining the extra services, that consumer should be able to
purchase at a lower price. Instead, all will have to pay the same uni-
form price.
Enforcement of the provisions of the proposed act will be up to
any person suffering or reasonably anticipating damage by reason of any
price cutting. It is to be expected that the courts will insist, as they have
in the enforcement of fair trade agreements,'" that failure to enforce
will be regarded as a waiver or abandonment of the right to enforce.
This will make it necessary for the manufacturer to spend additional
money to police the distributors and to bring lawsuits against even the
small retailers. Of course this adds to the cost of the product. In addi-
tion, any law which the public will not accept as reasonable or necessary
is bound to encounter enforcement difficulties. Most consumers will not
believe it to be wrong to buy at lower than established prices. Most re-
tailers will not be convinced that they are in the wrong by evading the
provisions of this bill. Some sort of a "grey-market" must be anticipated.
The bill purports to aid small retailers by enabling them to compete
with the larger retailers. In the Senate hearings held July 21, 1958,
Charles 1. Fort, president of Food Town Ethical Pharmacies, Inc.,
protested that passage of the bill would take away the best weapon that
small businesses have. Mr. Fort said the only hope of competing with
private brands sold by such large chains as Sears Roebuck was for smaller
retailers with low operating expenses to shave prices on national brands.' 9
So while some small retailers may benefit, Mr. Fort's statement shows
that others will certainly be harmed by this price fixing legislation.
CONCLUSION
It is not open to question that legislation necessary to preserve the
existence of small retailers in our economy is desirable, but the declared
purpose of this bill is to protect high profit margins, "so as to enlist the
16 Fulda, Resale Price Maintenance, 21 U. Ci-n. L. REv. 175, 199-201 (1954).
17 Procedure is outlined which would permit price reductions for damaged
goods, going out of business sales or discontinued items.
18 Fulda, supra note 16, at 202-03.
19 N.Y. Times, July 22, 1958, § C, p. 44, col. 1.
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active efforts of distributors." It is doubtful if this is an effective or an
acceptable means to accomplish an admittedly legitimate objective. The
effect of the bill, if enacted, would be to give a private party, the manu-
facturer, the power to dictate to the owner of property the price at
which that owner must dispose of that property. The provisions of this
bill should certainly be objected to as a violation of due process of law
and an unwarranted delegation of legislative power.
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